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Monthly Archives: February 2014

The Wires Cannot Be Trusted; Does DRM Have Something to Teach Us?

In the continuing revelations about the depth to which governments have gone to subjugate global communications in terms of privacy, anonymity, and security on the Internet, one thing is very clear: nothing can be trusted anymore.

Before you wipe this post off as smacking of ‘conspiracy theorist’, take the Snowden revelations disclosed since Christmas, particularly regarding the NSA’s Tailored Access Operations catalog that demonstrates the ways they can violate implicit trust in local hardware by infecting firmware at a level where even reboots and factory ‘resets’ cannot remove the implanted malware, or their “interdiction” of new computers that allow them to install spyware between the time it leaves the factory and arrives at your house.  At a broader level, because of the trend in global data movement towards centralizing data transit through a diminishing number of top tier carriers – a trend is eerily similar to wealth inequality in the digital era – governments and pseudo-governmental bodies have found it trivial to exact control with quantum insert attacks.  In these sophisticated attacks, malicious entities (which I define for these purposes as those who exploit trust to gain illicit access to a protected system) like the NSA or GCHQ can slipstream rogue servers that mimic trusted public systems such as LinkedIn to gain passwords and assume identities through ephemeral information gathering to attack other systems.

Considering these things, the troubling realization is this is not the failure of the NSA, the GCHQ, the US presidential administration, or the lack of public outrage to demand change.  The failure is in the infrastructure of the Internet itself.  If anything, these violations of trust simply showcase technical flaws we have chosen not to acknowledge to this point in the larger system’s architecture.  Endpoint encryption technologies like SSL became supplanted by forward versions of TLS because of underlying flaws not only in cipher strength, but in protocol assumptions that did not acknowledge all the ways in which the trust of a system or the interconnects between systems could be violated.  This is similarly true for BGP, which has seen a number of attacks that allow routers on the Internet to be reprogrammed to shunt traffic to malicious entities that can intercept it: a protocol that trusts anything is vulnerable because nothing can be trusted forever.

When I state nothing can be trusted, I mean absolutely nothing.  Your phone company definitely can’t be trusted – they’ve already been shown to have collapsed to government pressure to give up the keys to their part of the kingdom.  The very wires leading into your house can’t be trusted, they could already or someday will be tapped.  Your air-gapped laptop can’t be trusted, it’s being hacked with radio waves.

But, individual, private citizens are facing a challenge Hollywood has for years – how do we protect our content?  The entertainment industry has been chided for years on its sometimes Draconian attempts to limit use and restrict access to data by implementing encryption and hardware standards that run counter to the kind of free access analog storage mediums, like the VHS and cassette tapes of days of old, provided.  Perhaps there are lessons to be learned from their attempts to address the problem of “everything, everybody, and every device is malicious, but we want to talk to everything, everybody, on every device”.  One place to draw inspiration is HDCP, a protocol most people except hardcore AV enthusiasts are unaware of that establishes device authentication and encryption across each connection of an HD entertainment system.  Who would have thought when your six year old watches Monsters, Inc., those colorful characters are protected by such an advanced scheme on the cord that just runs from your Blu-ray player to your TV?

While you may not believe in DRM for your DVD’s from a philosophical or fair-use rights perspective, consider the striking difference with this approach:  in the OSI model, encryption occurs at Layer 6, on top of many other layers in the system.  This is an implicit trust of all layers below it, and this is the assumption violated in the headlines from the Guardian and NY Times that have captured our attention the most lately: on the Internet, he who controls the media layers also controls the host layers.  In the HDCP model, the encryption happens more akin to Layer 2, as the protocol expects someone’s going to splice a wire to try to bootleg HBO from their neighbor or illicitly pirate high-quality DVD’s.  Today if I gained access to a server closet in a corporate office, there is nothing technologically preventing me from splicing myself into a network connection and copying every packet on the connection.  The data that is encrypted on Layer 6 will be very difficult for me to make sense of, but there will be plenty of data that is not encrypted that I can use for nefarious purposes: ARP broadcasts, SIP metadata, DNS replies, and all that insecure HTTP or poorly-secured HTTPS traffic.  Even worse, it’s a jumping off point for setting up a MITM attack, such as an SSL Inspection Proxy.  Similarly, without media-layer security, savvy attackers with physical access to a server closet or the ability to coerce or hack into the next hop in the network path can go undetected if they redirect your traffic into rogue servers or into malicious networks, and because there is no chained endpoint authentication mechanism on the media-layer, there’s no way for you to know.

These concerns aren’t just theoretical either, and they’re not to protect teenagers’ rights to anonymously author provocative and mildly threatening anarchist manifestos.  They’re to protect your identity, your money, your family, and your security.  Only more will be accessible and controllable on the Internet going forward, and without appropriate protections in place, it won’t just be governments soon who can utilize the assumptions of trust in the Internet’s architecture and implementation for ill, but idealist hacker cabals, organized crime rings, and eventually, anyone with the right script kiddie program to exploit the vulnerabilities once better known and unaddressed.

Why aren’t we protecting financial information or credit card numbers with media-layer security so they’are at least as safe as Mickey Mouse on your HDTV?

 

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